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Abstract
Supply and demand largely determine the price of goods on human markets. It has been
proposed that in animals, similar forces influence the payoff distribution between trading
partners in sexual selection, intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism. Here
we present the first experimental evidence supporting biological market theory in a study
on cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus. Cleaners interact with two classes of clients: choosy
client species with access to several cleaners usually do not queue for service and do not
return if ignored, while resident client species with access to only one cleaning station do
queue or return. We used plexiglas plates with equal amounts of food to simulate these
behaviours of the two client classes. Cleaners soon inspected ‘choosy’ plates before
‘resident’ plates. This supports previous field observations that suggest that client species
with access to several cleaners exert choice to receive better (immediate) service.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Many cases of sexual selection, intraspecific cooperation and
interspecific mutualism have in common that interactions
can be seen as a trade between two individuals belonging to
two different classes of traders (Noe¨ et al. 1991; Noe¨ &
Hammerstein 1994). For example, males may offer nuptual
gifts to females in exchange for copulations (Thornhill
1976), territory owners allow unrelated helpers to stay within
the territory in exchange for feeding their offspring (Reyer
1986), and lycaenid butterfly larvae provide a sugar rich
solution for ants in exchange for protection against
predators (Pierce 1987). All examples have in common that
there is no apparent fixed exchange rate for the commod-
ities. Instead, the size of nuptual gifts, the effort of helpers
or the quantity of nectar solution correlate with the ratio of
the two trader classes: the fewer females, territory owners or
ants that are available, the higher is the offer of their
respective partner traders (Noe¨ et al. 1991; Noe¨ 2001). The
paradigm most used for the evolution of cooperation
between unrelated individuals, the iterated prisoner’s
dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), does not
account for a flexible payoff matrix. Therefore, Noe¨ and
colleagues (Noe¨ 1990; Noe¨ et al. 1991; Noe¨ & Hammerstein
1994; see also Bull & Rice 1991; Wilkinson & Sherratt 2001)
proposed that basic human market theory can provide the
general framework to predict payoff distributions among
partners in all these cases. The basic features of a market are
as follows (after Noe¨ 2001). (1) The choice of a partner is
based on expectations of a higher profit (fitness gain)
compared to a choice of another partner. (2) There is
competition among members of the more common
(chosen) class over access to the rare class. This competition
causes an increase in the value of the commodity offered. (3)
Supply and demand for the commodities exchanged
determine their value. (4) Commodities on offer can be
advertised (list of features taken from Noe¨ 2001). Thus,
market theory may explain strong asymmetries in payoffs as
long as one commodity that is short in supply and high in
demand is traded against a commonly available commodity
that is, therefore, in less demand.
Market theory qualitatively fits many examples of
fluctuating payoffs (examples in Noe¨ et al. 1991; Noe¨
2001). In addition, several recent studies on sexual selection,
intraspecific cooperation and interspecific mutualism have
used market theory to test predictions about payoff
distributions and provided observational support for market
theory (Barrett et al. 1999; Henzi & Barrett 1999; Pavlowsky
& Dunbar 1999; Stopka & MacDonald 1999; Green et al.
2000; Bshary 2001; Bshary & Scha¨ffer in press). However,
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experimental evidence that it is the option to choose
between potential partners that causes a shift in payoff
distribution is still lacking.
Here, we present the first experiments designed to test
predictions from market theory, using the cleaner fish
Labroides dimidiatus as subjects. Cleaner fish remove parasites
and other material from the surface, the gills and sometimes
the mouth of ‘client’ reef fish, which visit them at their so
called cleaning stations (recent reviews: Losey et al. 1999;
Coˆte´ 2000). From a market point of view, client species can
be categorized as either resident species with small
territories or home ranges that usually allow them to access
one cleaning station only, or as species with larger home
ranges that cover several cleaning stations. As the latter can
choose between different cleaners, we call them choosy
clients. Cleaners compete among each other over access to
choosy clients, while each cleaner has exclusive access to its
resident clients. In market terms, cleaners have a ‘veto
position’ (Kahan & Rapoport 1984) for interactions with
residents: residents either visit them or are not inspected at
all. Market theory therefore predicts that the service quality
offered by cleaners should be relatively poor, i.e. just high
enough that there remains a net benefit for the client so that
it keeps visiting the cleaner. Choosy clients, however, are
expected to use their choice options to try and play cleaners
off against each other. They should visit cleaning stations
where the service is better than average, inducing cleaners to
raise their service quality to out-compete others. The
cheaper it is for choosy clients to exert their choice, the
more cleaners are expected to be pushed towards a service
quality that leaves them just a net benefit.
We focused on one single aspect of service quality:
whether or not clients are inspected immediately after they
arrive at a cleaning station. Cleaners cannot always offer
immediate service to all clients as sometimes two or more
clients seek inspection simultaneously. Under such circum-
stances, the cleaner has to make a choice of which client to
inspect first and which one it will let wait. Waiting at a
cleaning station incurs some costs on the clients as it is often
incompatible with other activities, such as foraging.
According to market theory, choosy clients should have
priority of access over residents because they would use
their choice options otherwise and switch to another cleaner
fish, while residents have to stick to their partner cleaner
fish. Observations by Bshary (2001) revealed that choosy
clients indeed have priority of access. In addition, Bshary &
Scha¨ffer (in press) found that if choosy clients are ignored
they will switch to another cleaner, but if they are inspected
they often return to the same cleaning station. These data
make it likely that the clients’ choosiness causes their
priority of access over resident clients. The causal link
between choosyness and priority of access, however, is
missing. Therefore alternative explanations cannot be
refuted. For example, cleaners interact longer and more
frequently with parasitized rather than unparasitized clients
(Gorlick 1984; Sikkel et al. 2000; Bshary & Grutter in press).
Choosy clients could thus be a better food patch because
they are often larger than resident clients (Bshary 2001), and
fish size is often correlated with parasite load (Grutter 1995;
Grutter & Poulin 1998). In addition, choosy clients might be
more heavily infested independently of body size if they visit
cleaners less frequently to optimize their own foraging, or
covering larger areas increases infection rate. Thus, the
cleaners’ preference for client species with choice options
might simply be explained by optimal foraging decisions
(marginal value theorem, Charnov 1976; Parker & Stuart
1976) which do not account for client strategies.
To test whether or not there is a causal link between
client choice options (and corresponding behaviour) and
priority of access at cleaning stations, we designed experi-
ments that controlled for food patch quality. We used two
plexiglas plates attached to a lever construction (Fig. 1) to
simulate the natural behaviour of choosy clients and resident
clients. We assumed that under natural conditions, cleaners
obtain information about which client is choosy and which
client is a resident in two ways. (1) Choosy clients usually
swim off if they are not inspected immediately, while
resident clients tend to queue for service (Bshary 2001). (2)
If ignored, choosy clients usually switch to another cleaning
station (Bshary & Scha¨ffer in press), while resident clients
are likely to return as soon the cleaner is available again
(R. Bshary, personal observation). We simulated these
differences in two experiments. In Experiment 1, we
retrieved the ‘choosy plate’ if the cleaner did not start
foraging on it and left the ‘resident plate’ until it had been
inspected by the cleaner. In Experiment 2, we always
Figure 1 Experimental setup, showing the situation prior to the
removal of the opaque barrier on the right that prevents the cleaner
fish from accessing the two plexiglas plates that are slid into its
compartment. The lever construction above the compartment,
inaccessible (due to the second opaque barrier on the left) to the
cleaner, allows retrieval of the plates without interfering directly
with the cleaner. The black dots on the two plexiglas plates indicate
the positions of the food items.
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retrieved the plate that was at first neglected but we slid the
resident plate back after the cleaner had finished with the
choosy plate (which was then retrieved) while the choosy
plate was only available in the next trial. The two plates were
similar in colour and shape but one was double the height of
the other one to allow cleaners to differentiate between
them and to monitor the ‘behaviour’ of the two plates.
Otherwise, the two plates had the same amount of food on
them in each trial. The cleaners were challenged to maximize
their food intake, which meant that they had to forage on
the choosy plate first so that they could feed on both plates
within each trial. According to marginal value theorem
(Charnov 1976; Parker & Stuart 1976), both plates should
be equally attractive as they offered the same amount of
food. In contrast, market theory would predict that due to
the differences in ‘behaviour’, cleaners should develop a
preference for the choosy plate during a series of trials.
METHODS
Study site and subjects
The experiments were conducted in June/July 2000 at
Lizard Island Research Station, Lizard Island, Great Barrier
Reef, Australia. Using barrier nets, we caught 12 adult
cleaner fish, Labroides dimidiatus, from the nearby lagoon.
Labroides dimidiatus is one of the main cleaning organisms
and interacts with more than 2000 clients per day in this area
(Grutter 1996).
Holding conditions
Cleaners were initially held pair-wise in aquaria of a
minimum size of 50 · 20 · 20 cm, with a constant flow
of fresh sea water. Small polyvinyl pipes (15 cm long) were
added for shelter. The fish were held in captivity for at least
25 days before being tested in the experiments. Their diet
consisted of shrimps mashed onto plexiglas plates of
variable size (from 7 · 10 cm to 10 · 20 cm). Cleaners
became used to this feeding method within 1 week and after
a maximum of 2 weeks would begin to feed while we placed
the plates in the aquaria. Successively, each pair of cleaners
was tested simultaneously in two experimental aquaria,
which were 100 · 25 · 25 cm in size, consisting of two
compartments. The compartment with the cleaner fish was
75 cm long and had sand on the bottom. The polyvinyl pipe
for shelter was placed centrally into the compartment in a
way that its opening faced the opaque plexiglas wall (Fig. 1).
Each cleaner spent one night in the experimental tank
before it was tested in Experiment 1 the next morning.
Experiment 1 lasted 2 days for each cleaner. After a 2-day
recovery period in their original holding tank, cleaners were
again moved into the experimental tank where they were
held for one night and tested in Experiment 2 the next
morning. Experiment 2 lasted 1 day for each cleaner. After
the experiments were finished, all fish were released at the
site of their capture.
General methods of experiments
Food units of prawn were measured with a high precision
scale. In each trial, one food unit (0.001 g  0.0003) was
placed on each of the two plexiglas plates within a
2 · 2 cm2 area. The food was spread out so that 4–5 small
food items were on each plate. The food was on the outer
sides of the two plates, facing the aquarium walls (Fig. 1), so
that cleaners could not rapidly switch between feeding on
either plate. One plate was 14 · 5 cm in size, the other one
was 14 · 10 cm in size. Each plate was connected to a lever
above the compartment which enabled us to push the plates
through the gaps into the cleaners’ compartment, and to
retrieve them whenever we wanted them out of reach of the
cleaner (Fig. 1). The order in which each plate was
presented either through the left or the right gap during
successive trials was predetermined with coin tossing. We
did not use random sequences that dictated the same pattern
in more than 3 successive trials to reduce the risk that
cleaners might develop a side preference. Before the two
plates were slid into the cleaner’s compartment, the cleaner
was confined to the opposite side of its compartment by
placing an opaque white plastic wall in the middle of the
compartment. The white plastic wall was slightly wider than
the aquarium to provide a good seal, so it was not at a right
angle to the aquarium sides (Fig. 1). The two plates were
pushed for an equal distance through the gaps. Because of
the opaque plastic, the cleaner could not get any information
on where the choosy plate and where the resident plate was.
In addition, the observer did not know where the cleaner
fish was at any time. The white plastic was lifted after
6–10 s. While lifting the white plastic, the observer twisted it
slightly so that its two sides would constantly touch the
aquarium walls to prevent the plastic from causing
unwanted water circulation and then placed it on top of
the aquarium. By the time the plastic was out of the water,
the cleaners had often already begun to forage on one of the
two plates. The plate where the cleaner fed on first as
determined by direct observation was scored as the one it
preferred.
Experiment 1: does the behaviour Ôone plate remains
until inspected while the other one does notÕ induce
a cleaner preference for the latter?
On day 1, cleaners were exposed to two sessions consisting
of 5 trials each. Time intervals between trials were 30 min,
and between sessions they were 60 min. Two cleaners were
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tested simultaneously every day, one with the small plate
simulating the unwillingness of choosy clients to queue and
one with the large plate simulating the very same thing.
Cleaners could feed on the choosy plate only if they started
to forage on it before they went foraging on the resident
plate. Otherwise, the choosy plate was withdrawn while the
cleaner was foraging on the resident plate, just as choosy
clients leave if they are not inspected immediately. In
contrast, the resident plate always stayed in the cleaner’s
compartment until the cleaner had stopped foraging on it,
just as resident clients often queue for service if the cleaner
inspects another client. For each session, we scored a
cleaner’s preference for the choosy plate if it had foraged
first on that plate at least three times out of five trials.
Otherwise, we scored a cleaner preference for the resident
plate. On the second day, we reversed the client behaviour
each plate simulated. So if the small plate had simulated a
choosy client on the first day, it simulated a resident client
on the second day, and vice versa. As on day 1, we had two
sessions consisting of five trials each, and we scored cleaner
preference as we did for the first day. We used Sign-Tests to
determine whether a significant majority of cleaners had a
preference for the choosy plate in any of the total four
sessions.
Experiment 2: does the behaviour Ôresident plate comes
back soon after being ignored while the choosy plate
does notÕ induce a cleaner preference for the latter?
Experiment 2 lasted 1 day, consisting of three sessions of
five trials each. Time intervals between consecutive trials
within sessions were 20 min, and between sessions they
were 40 min. The same cleaners as in Experiment 1 were
used. The major difference to Experiment 1 was that we
always first pulled back the plate on which the cleaner did
not feed immediately. As choosy clients usually switch to
another cleaning station if they are not inspected immedi-
ately, the choosy plate would not be slid back until the next
trial. In contrast, the resident plate was pushed in again as
soon as the cleaner had stopped foraging on the choosy
plate (which was then removed), just as resident clients
usually come back to the cleaner soon after being ignored.
The behaviour the two plates simulated was not reversed.
Instead, we tried to test cleaners against their overall
preference in Experiment 1. Thus, the cleaner out of each
pair that had shown the overall stronger preference for the
small plate in Experiment 1 was tested with the large plate
simulating the behaviour of clients with choice options,
while the small plate simulated the same behaviour for the
second cleaner. Using this approach, we could not test all
cleaners against their overall preference in Experiment 1, as
a significant majority of them had fed first from the small
plate more often than from the large plate (Sign-Test,
N  12, x  1, P < 0.01). As in Experiment 1, we
determined cleaner preferences in each session and used
Sign-Tests to determine whether a significant majority of
cleaners had a preference for the choosy plate in any of the
three sessions.
RESULTS
Experiment 1: does the behaviour Ôone plate remains
until inspected while the other one does notÕ induce
a cleaner preference for the latter?
A significant majority of cleaners interacted more often with
the choosy plate first during the second session (Sign-Test,
N  12, x  2, P < 0.05) and, after the behaviour the two
plates simulated was reversed, again during the fourth
session (Sign-Test, n  12, x  1, P < 0.01, Fig. 2). During
sessions 1 and 3, when the situation was new to the cleaners,
there was no significant preference for the choosy plate
(Sign-Tests, session 1: n  12, x  5, not significant (n.s.);
session 4, n  12, x  6, n.s., Fig. 2). A trial by trial analysis
indicates that cleaners carried over their built up preference
for the choosy plate to the next day, leading initially to
relatively many ‘mistakes’ as the behaviour that the plates
simulated was now reversed (Fig. 3).
Experiment 2: does the behaviour Ôresident plate comes
back soon after being ignored while the choosy plate
does notÕ induce a cleaner preference for the latter?
A significant majority of cleaners interacted more often with
the choosy plate first during the second and third sessions
(Sign-Tests, session 2: N  12, x  1, P < 0.01; session 4,
N  12, x  1, P < 0.01, Fig. 4). During sessions 1, there
was no significant preference for the choosy plate
(Sign-Test, session 1: N  12, x  5, n.s., Fig. 5). As
intended by us, a trial-by-trial analysis indicated that cleaners
may indeed have carried over their preferences from
Experiment 1 into Experiment 2. They began with a
relatively low success rate but improved strongly during the
first session (v2-test, trials 1 + 2 against trials 4 + 5,
v1
2  5.4, N  24, P < 0.05, Fig. 5).
D I S C U S S I O N
We used plexiglas plates to simulate the natural behaviour of
two different client categories, namely resident clients with
access to one cleaning station only, and choosy clients with
access to several cleaning stations. Like choosy clients, the
choosy plate was accessible to cleaners only if they started to
feed on it immediately. In contrast, cleaners had always
access to the resident plate, simulating their veto-position
(Kahan & Rapoport 1984) towards resident clients in the
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wild. The cleaners were challenged to maximize their food
intake. This meant that they had to forage on the choosy
plate first so that they could feed on both plates within each
trial. Overall, the cleaners were able to solve this problem
and developed a preference for the choosy plate.
Our experiment was abstract in several ways. First, the
two plates did not resemble any client fish species in both
shape and thickness. Second, our choosy plate did not visit
another cleaner if it was not serviced immediately as natural
clients would do (Bshary & Scha¨ffer in press). However, we
offered the cleaners the very same clues that they could
potentially rely on in the wild to distinguish between choosy
client species and resident client species. From a cleaner’s
perspective, our experiments thus simulated a problem that
they have to solve frequently under natural conditions,
whenever a choosy client and a resident seek their service
simultaneously. Field observations have shown that cleaners
indeed give choosy clients priority of access over resident
clients (Bshary 2001). In addition, it has been shown that
choosy clients make use of their choice options and visit
another cleaning station if they are ignored (Bshary &
Scha¨ffer in press). Our results controlled for patch quality
and we found that the choosy plate had priority of access
over the resident plate, and that the cleaners’ preference
could be reversed if the behaviour of the two plates was
reversed. Note that the cleaners’ decision rule in the
experiments could be very simple and within the framework
of optimality approaches, i.e. when you start foraging avoid
the patch you have depleted last. In combination with the
evidence on client behaviour under natural conditions,
however, the experimental results clearly support the game
theoretic approach to cleaning symbiosis based on market
theory (Noe¨ et al. 1991) and not the classical marginal value
approach (Charnov 1976; Parker & Stuart 1976).
Cleaners used information on both ‘plate behaviours’
and differentiated between the two client categories the
two plates simulated. The plate that simulated the
behaviour of resident clients, i.e. remaining available until
inspected or trying again shortly after being ignored, was
soon approached only after inspection of the choosy plate
was complete. This makes it plausible that cleaners use the
same clues also in the wild to differentiate between
residents and choosy clients. At the very least, our results
show that cleaners can learn to use such clues relatively
fast in an experimental situation.
Figure 2 Experiment 1: median, interquartiles and range of per-
centage correct choices (to optimize food intake by foraging first
on the choosy plate) of 12 cleaner fish in four experimental ses-
sions in which the resident plate (but not the choosy plate) was left
in the cleaners’ compartment until the cleaners had finished
inspection. Between session 2 and session 3, the correct choice for
optimizing the food intake was reversed as indicated by the vertical
barrier. *P < 0.05; **P < 0.01.
Figure 3 Experiment 1: trial-by-trial analysis of the number of
cleaners (out of 12) that made the correct choice (optimize food
intake by foraging first on the choosy plate). After 10 trials, the
correct choice was reversed. The dashed line represents the
expected value if cleaners chose randomly.
Figure 4 Experiment 2: median, interquartiles and range of per-
centage correct choices (optimize food intake by foraging first on
choosy plate) of 12 cleaner fish in three experimental sessions. The
plate that was initially ignored was retrieved and only the resident
plate (but not the choosy plate) was pushed back into the cleaners’
compartment after the cleaners had finished inspection of the first
plate. **P < 0.01.
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In conclusion, the experimental data support previous
field observations that suggest that choosy clients have
priority of access over resident clients (Bshary 2001) because
they would otherwise switch to another cleaner for their
next inspection (Bshary & Scha¨ffer in press). Choosy clients
thus receive a better payoff out of cleaning interactions than
resident clients as they avoid the costs of waiting. While our
experiments dealt with one aspect of partner choice, access
to several cleaning stations instead of only one might
influence other aspects of cleaner–client interactions. One
of these has to do with the way clients react to cheating by
cleaners. Cheating refers to the removal of healthy client
tissue rather than parasites by the cleaner (Bshary & Grutter
in press). Choosy clients mainly react to cheating by cleaners
with swimming off and visiting another cleaner for the next
inspection (Bshary & Scha¨ffer in press). Resident clients, in
contrast, do not have this option and therefore have to
expend energy to punish cheating cleaners by chasing them
around (Bshary & Grutter in press). These two different
control mechanisms (partner switching and punishment) do
not seem to lead to different cleaner cheating frequencies
(Bshary 2001), but the responses of different client species
to cleaner fish cheating are best understood within the
framework of market theory.
Market theory with its emphasis on partner choice
options (Noe¨ & Hammerstein 1995; Noe¨ 2001) thus
provides a major framework to predict shifts in payoff
distributions and partner control mechanisms in the cleaner
fish mutualism. For the future, it will be particularly
interesting to (1) develop and test quantitative predictions
(see Hoeksema & Bruna 2000), and (2) integrate market
theory with partner control theory, i.e. how partners prevent
each other from cheating in potentially cooperative inter-
actions. The paradigm for partner control theory, the
iterated prisoner’s dilemma game (Axelrod & Hamilton
1981) does not allow the option to switch partners.
Extensions of the model have mainly dealt with the option
for cheaters to rove and switch partners to avoid retaliation
(Dugatkin & Wilson 1991; Enquist & Leimar 1993; but see
Ferriere & Michod 1995). In the mutualism between
L. dimidiatus and its clients, however, this is reversed as
cleaners are stationary and it is up to the clients to choose
their cleaner. For the sake of realism, game theoretic models
should thus explicitly allow cheated individuals to switch
partners.
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